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Ways to Change: A Reevaluation of Article V 
Campaigns and Legislative Constitutionalism 
Mary Ziegler 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent scholarship has convincingly shown that social 
movements shape constitutional law, and vice versa.1 To date, most 
theories study alternatives to formal constitutional amendments or 
consider the proper role for the courts in influencing the 
development of social movements.2 In this Article, however, I 
approach the question of constitutional change from the standpoint 
of social movements that oppose a constitutional decision. What 
tools are available to a movement seeking to change the meaning of 
a decision? What are the advantages or disadvantages of pursuing an 
Article V amendment, of codifying a favorable constitutional 
interpretation by statute, or beginning a litigation campaign? 
Often, current constitutional change scholarship has neglected 
these questions and has instead focused on the identification, study, 
 
  Mary Ziegler is a Ruebhausen Fellow in Law and Postdoctoral Associate in Law at 
Yale Law School. I would especially like to thank Martha Minow and Serena Mayeri for their 
help and patience during the completion of this Article. 
 1. See, e.g., Reva Siegel & Robert Post, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) [hereinafter Siegel & Post, Roe 
Rage]. See generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, 
and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2004) (arguing that popular constitutionalism 
and judicial supremacy are not mutually exclusive systems of legal ordering, but instead 
represent understandings and practices that dialectically structure our current system); Reva 
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case 
of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1336–40 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture]. 
 2. See, e.g., William Eskridge, Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public 
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 422, 460–98 (2001); William Eskridge, Pluralism and Distrust: 
How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 
1281–83, 1297–300 (2005); Siegel & Post, Roe Rage, supra note 1, at 384–85 (exploring 
how, through democratic constitutionalism, “[t]he Court must navigate a complex field of 
intense disagreement in order to produce an account of constitutional law that is 
democratically legitimate and faithful to norms of professional craft”); see also supra text 
accompanying note 1. 
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and defense of alternatives to formal constitutional amendments.3 
Consequently, theory to date has inadequately studied why and how 
social movements should use different methods of constitutional 
change-making in practice.4 In telling stories about a proposed 
Human Life Amendment,5 right-to-die lawyering,6 the Freedom of 
Choice Act,7 and the litigation of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
 
 3. See, e.g., Siegel & Post, Roe Rage, supra note 1, at 430 (explaining the virtues of 
democratic constitutionalism and the ways in which “judges can use flexible constitutional 
standards to channel and mediate conflict, guiding public dialogue about hotly controverted 
social practices and endeavoring to shape the social meaning of competing claims”); William 
Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215–17, 1272–76 (2001) 
(explaining the nature of super-statutes and comparing them favorably to judicially-driven 
changes or the “constitutional moments” that produced the New Deal or the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS, Vol. II, 
2–31 (1998) (arguing that constitutional moments offer the best chance for scholars to 
identify the “conditions under which future movements may legitimately claim that the People 
have given them a mandate for fundamental constitutional change”). 
 4. Several scholars have raised intriguing questions about the value of litigation as a 
tool for constitutional change. See, e.g., MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 463–68 (2004) 
(explaining how and why the courts are institutionally incapable of generating social change); 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1439 (2005) (arguing that social movements should not define 
themselves through litigation, since by doing so, movements will lose their ability to radicalize 
and set political agendas). 
 5. Beginning in 1974, pro-life legislators and activists proposed a variety of federal 
constitutional amendments that would overrule Roe v. Wade. In the early 1970s, legislators or 
activists proposed amendments that would extend due process and equal protection guarantees 
“from the moment of conception,” to permit the states to ban abortion, or require them to do 
so. See Human Life Amendments: Major Texts, 1973–2003, The National Campaign for a 
Human Life Amendment, available at http://www.nchla.org/datasource/idocuments/ 
HLAmajortexts.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2009). For ease of reading, I refer to this struggle to 
amend the Constitution as the Human Life Amendment Campaign. 
 6. I refer in particular to the litigation of Cruzan by Cruzan v. Missouri Department of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In Cruzan, the parents of Nancy Cruzan, a woman in a 
vegetative state, requested that life-saving medical treatment be removed. Id. at 267–68. 
Medical care providers refused, citing a Missouri law that required clear and convincing 
evidence of a person’s desire to terminate medical treatment. Id. at 267–69. Cruzan’s parents 
challenged the Missouri statute on constitutional grounds, claiming that the law violated 
Nancy Cruzan’s right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Id. The Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute, holding that any right to refuse treatment extended only to 
competent, voluntary decisions. Id. at 279–80. 
 7. First proposed in 1988, the ultimately unsuccessful Freedom of Choice Act 
promised to “codify” Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Bill that Would Lower Abortion 
Hurdles Has Lost Speed, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 16, 1993, at A8. Early versions 
of the Act prohibited all or most abortion restrictions before viability and gave women the 
right to have an abortion after viability when doing so was necessary for the woman’s life or 
health. See, e.g., Scott Maben, House Panel Oks Bill to Guard Abortion Rights, HOUS. CHRON., 
Oct. 5, 1990, at 3. 
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Pennsylvania v. Casey,8 I give a preliminary account of the advantages 
of two underemphasized change-making tools—Article V campaigns 
and efforts to change the meaning of judicial decisions by statute. 9 
In showing that the Article V amendment process is slow and 
cumbersome, current scholarship has described alternatives to the 
formal amendment process that are argued to be more dynamic and 
more easily manipulated by popular movements.10 Similarly, since the 
Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores11 placed 
stringent limits on Congress’s fourteenth-amendment authority to 
define constitutional rights or remedies differently than the Court, 
scholars have questioned the continuing value of using legislative 
campaigns to change the Constitution’s meaning.12 
By illustrating the shortcomings of the formal amendment 
process or legislative struggles, however, we risk losing sight of the 
ways in which movements can productively use these campaigns to 
change the meaning of constitutional precedents. Using the Human 
 
 8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey reaffirmed the continuing validity of Roe, but rejected 
its trimester framework, explaining that abortion restrictions should be held unconstitutional 
only if they were an undue burden on women’s decision to have an abortion. Id. at 869–76. 
 9. A point of clarification is in order. My argument involves what Mark Tushnet has 
called the “thin Constitution,” the equality and liberty principles expressed in the Declaration 
of Independence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Bill of Rights. See MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9–12 (1999). I do not explore how, if 
at all, social movements make claims about the parts of the Constitution that address the 
organization of government. 
 10. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 15–17 (illustrating the shortcomings of a 
“hypertextualist” reading of Article V and the benefits of “constitutional moments” as an 
alternative to the Article V process); William Eskridge, America’s Statutory “Constitution,” 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 23–24, 30 (2007) (arguing that constitutional amendments have been 
“too hard to achieve under the super-majority requirements of Article V” and proposing 
“super-statutes” as an alternative avenue for change); see also Jack Balkin, Original Meaning 
and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 473 (2007) (attributing the 
rarity of new Article V amendments to “the supermajority rules in Article V,” which “make it 
so easy for a minority to block an amendment”). 
 11. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 12. See, e.g., Reva Siegel & Robert Post, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 445 (2000) 
(“However interpreted, the Court’s decisions in Kimel and Morrison [applying the Boerne 
framework] impose new and substantial restrictions on Congress’s power to enact 
antidiscrimination laws under Section 5. This is because both decisions conceive of the 
legitimacy of Section 5 power as ancillary to judicial authority to enforce Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); David Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 958, 973 (2001) (arguing that the Boerne Court’s “‘congruence and proportionality’” 
test “reflects . . . new distrust of congressional judgments” about “what is needed to protect 
constitutional rights”). 
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Life Amendment as a model, I argue instead that Article V 
campaigns provide movements with the time and freedom to explore 
and refine new constitutional ideas. Because Article V amendment 
proposals produce struggles that stretch over years or decades, a 
social movement has time to develop unified arguments that address 
countermovement challenges. And because Article V campaigns are 
not governed by the rules limiting congressional authority and do 
not require deference to Supreme Court precedent, social 
movements pursuing formal amendments have more freedom to 
offer new understandings of the meaning of the Constitution. 
In evaluating the Freedom of Choice Act, I contend that the 
limits imposed in legislative struggles on movements’ freedom to 
explore different constitutional arguments—the political pressures to 
win votes and the legal pressure not to raise questions about 
congressional authority—force movements rapidly to develop 
precise, conflict-tested claims. In turn, these claims may prove 
beneficial in subsequent litigation. 
What do we learn from viewing constitutional change in the way 
I propose? If we consider constitutional change from the point of 
view of a social movement member displeased with the outcome of a 
judicial decision, we can begin to understand which social, political, 
or legal factors make a particular method of constitutional change 
productive. Instead of regarding modes of constitutional change in 
isolation or arguing about which method of change is most effective, 
I contend that social movements should use Article V campaigns and 
legislative proposals as part of their arsenal of tools to change the 
meaning of a constitutional decision. 
In Part II of this Article, I situate my argument in the context of 
current literature on constitutional change. In Part IIIA, by studying 
the Human Life Amendment of the 1970s and 1980s, I consider the 
benefits and costs of Article V campaigns. In Part IIIB, I study the 
constitutional arguments that emerged from the Human Life 
campaign and their influence on the litigation of Cruzan ex rel. 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.13 
Based on an examination of the Freedom of Choice Act of the 
early 1990s and the litigation of Casey,14 Part IV considers an 
alternative model for campaigns to use to change the meaning of a 
 
 13. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 14. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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judicial decision. In Part IVA, I apply this model to analyze the costs 
of using legislative campaigns to change the meaning of a 
constitutional decision. In Part IVB, by exploring the influence of 
movement-countermovement conflict on Casey, I examine the 
benefits that may outweigh those costs. Part V offers a brief 
conclusion. 
II. PRACTICING CHANGE 
How would we view constitutional change differently if we took 
the point of view of a social movement member? Recent scholarship 
has given a provocative account of the ways that social movements 
and constitutional law influence one another.15 For the most part, as 
I argue below, current theory offers alternatives to formal 
constitutional amendments or focuses on the role that courts should 
play in influencing the development of social movements. 
Scholars like Reva Siegel and Robert Post carefully studied the 
ways that movement-countermovement contests produce 
constitutional arguments likely to be adopted by the courts.16 Siegel 
and Post proposed a model they call “democratic constitutionalism,” 
whereby the courts balance the need for a politically neutral, 
independent rule of law with the call for democratic legitimacy.17 
They argue that social movement attorneys should not shy away 
from conflict, explaining that the “question is which constitutional 
vision will influence the Court; it is not whether the Court will 
express a constitutional vision.”18 
I agree with Siegel and Post about the importance of movement-
countermovement conflict in reshaping constitutional law. However, 
my focus is not on judges’ obligation to balance democratic 
responsiveness and political independence, but rather on the 
concrete strategies social movements can use to achieve 
constitutional change. 
My focus leads to a different portrayal of the dialogic contests 
between movements and counter-movements that contribute to 
changes in constitutional meaning. Siegel and Post are sensitive to 
 
 15. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
 16. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text. In a related but distinctive vein, 
William Eskridge’s work focuses on the role played by the courts in shaping identity-based 
social movements themselves. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 17. See, e.g., Siegel & Post, Roe Rage, supra note 1, at 433. 
 18. Id. 
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the exchanges between competing movements and those between 
movements and officials.19 The stories they tell, however, often stress 
the judicial decisions that make new constitutional understandings 
enforceable.20 By concentrating less exclusively on these decisions, I 
hope to show the extent to which movements can and should move 
between different constitutional arenas and strategies, including 
those often thought to have little value. 
My second purpose is to shift the focus of constitutional change 
scholarship away from emphasis on why one method of change is 
more effective, significant, or normatively desirable than others. 
Current constitutional theorists propose a number of alternatives to 
the formal amendment process and explain the relative virtues of the 
models they propose. For example, Bruce Ackerman’s study of 
“constitutional moments” identifies an alternative to formal 
amendments and highlights the particular virtues of that approach.21 
Ackerman describes constitutional moments as times at which 
“Americans have translated the heady rhetoric of constitutional 
politics into enduring judgments of higher law.”22 Like Siegel and 
Post, Ackerman proposes a model of constitutional change that does 
not require compliance with the rigid, formal Article V amendment 
process.23 However, constitutional moments, as Ackerman envisions 
them, occur only rarely, when the people as a whole are fully 
engaged in considering a proposed constitutional change.24 In 
Ackerman’s view, the rarity of constitutional moments helps to 
explain their significance: it is only at these times that “a broad 
movement of transformative opinion [earns] the authority to set 
major aspects of the political agenda.”25 
By contrast, William Eskridge and John Ferejohn describe the 
unique virtues of a category of statutes that are more “normatively 
powerful” than ordinary statutes—laws that emerge from long 
 
 19. See, e.g., Siegel & Post, Roe Rage, supra note 1, at 373–87. 
 20. See Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 1, at 1323 (focusing on how 
“constitutional culture channels social movement conflict to produce enforceable 
constitutional understandings”); Siegel & Post, Roe Rage, supra note 1, at 406–30 
(emphasizing how “a constitutional decision can be politically responsive at the same time it 
affirms a commitment to the law/politics distinction”). 
 21. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 6, 15–17. 
 22. Id. at 6. 
 23. See id. at 16–17. 
 24. See id. at 409. 
 25. Id. 
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periods of deliberation and democratic exchange and reflect 
important, foundational principles.26 They argue that these “super-
statutes” are normatively appealing and perhaps more appealing than 
the alternatives offered by other scholars.27 To reach this conclusion, 
Eskridge and Ferejohn compare super-statutes to “constitutional 
moments”—“defined historical moment[s] involving a normative 
showdown.”28 A regime characterized by super-statutes would better 
prevent unelected judges from abusing their power.29 Eskridge and 
Ferejohn also criticize the “updating” of constitutional meaning by 
unelected judges, referring to the criticisms of jurocracy often leveled 
against a system of judicial review.30 
Scholars like Eskridge, Ferejohn, and Ackerman set out to 
identify sometimes radically different alternatives to formal 
constitutional amendments and to illustrate the unique benefits 
associated with each alternative. However, because these theorists 
focus on what makes a proposed amendment analogue appealing or 
distinctive, their scholarship does not address how different 
constitutional methods of change can and should be used together. 
My project here is to consider the complex ways that social 
movements shift between different constitutional arenas and 
strategies in order to accomplish one kind of constitutional change—
revisions in the meaning of politically engaging constitutional 
precedents. 
Unlike these authors, I am not identifying a new mode of 
constitutional change so much as considering the concrete, context-
specific benefits or costs of using different tools to change the 
meaning of a judicial decision. Consequently, I am interested not 
only in novel modes of change or in what makes any one superior, 
but also in if and when movements can productively combine 
different methods. As a part of this analysis, I argue that movements 
should reconsider the concrete benefits of using underemphasized, 
widely criticized methods of constitutional change: legislative and 
formal amendment campaigns. 
Those who have studied alternatives to the formal amendment 
process have joined a chorus of scholars criticizing the structure of 
 
 26. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 1217. 
 27. See id. at 1264–75. 
 28. Id. at 1273. 
 29. See id. at 1272–73. 
 30. Id. at 1267–68. 
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Article V.31 Various scholars contend that Article V guarantees that 
the Constitution’s meaning will change rarely,32 that minorities can 
obstruct otherwise popular or necessary changes,33 or that the 
structure of Article V was “not the product of a process meeting 
contemporary standards of equality and democracy.”34 
Scholars give different reasons for concern about legislative 
efforts to change the meaning of constitutional precedents. In 1997, 
the City of Boerne v. Flores35 Court struck down the Religious 
Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA),36 concluding that the Act 
exceeded the scope of congressional authority under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.37 The Court explained that Congress’s power “to 
enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the power “to 
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”38 Rather, 
Section Five allows Congress only to remedy what the Court would 
determine to be violations of the Constitution.39 Concluding that 
RFRA exceeded the scope of Congress’s remedial power, the Court 
emphasized that there was a lack of “congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end.”40 
In the wake of Boerne, scholars claim the Court has “forcefully 
repudiated” the premise “that there [is] a dialectical relationship 
between constitutional law and constitutional culture.”41 
Commentators have also argued that, after Boerne, Congress no 
longer has the freedom to endorse interpretations of constitutional 
rights offered by social movements that are different than the 
Court’s.42 
 
 31. See infra notes 32, 34 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Eskridge, supra note 10, at 23–24, 30. 
 33. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 10, at 473. 
 34. Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, and 
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 121 n.60 (2005). 
 35. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 36. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (1994)). 
 37. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. 
 38. Id. at 519. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. at 520. 
 41. Robert Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 29 (2003); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 42. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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In illustrating the downsides of these methods of constitutional 
change and the alternatives to them, however, theory to date has 
underemphasized the continuing benefits to be gained through 
them. By analyzing different models of constitutional change, I hope 
to open a discussion about when and how various strategies result in 
constitutional change. In reevaluating constitutional change 
scholarship from the standpoint of a social movement, I argue that 
social movements should be open to using Article V campaigns and 
legislative proposals as tools to change the meaning of a 
constitutional decision. 
I will explore these issues by first considering the Human Life 
Amendment model for constitutional change, one initiated by a 
campaign for an Article V amendment and leading to an effective 
litigation struggle in Cruzan. 
III. THE HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT MODEL 
The Human Life Amendment model offers insight into the ways 
that social movements can combine different strategies to alter the 
meaning of important judicial decisions. This model emerged from a 
struggle for a formal amendment that lasted more than a decade. 
Current scholarship has called into question the continuing 
importance of such Article V campaigns in changing constitutional 
meaning. Bruce Ackerman warns that “[w]hatever the future may 
hold, don’t expect big changes through formal amendments.”43 
Others, like Reva Siegel, show how Article V amendment campaigns 
“mobilize[] groups of citizens, acting inside and outside the formal 
procedures of the legal system.”44 
Drawing on the Human Life model of constitutional change, I 
argue that amendment campaigns can and should be used by social 
movements not only because they mobilize support but also because 
 
 43. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742 (2007); 
see also Eskridge, supra note 10, at 23–24 (“Constitutional amendments were too hard to 
achieve under the super-majority requirements of Article V.”). 
 44. See Reva Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement 
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 299 (2001). For examples of this effect, see, e.g., Bruce 
Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1520 (1997) (explaining 
how the campaign for the Nineteenth Amendment “mobilize[d] millions of women, and also 
men”); Dan Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 149, 161 (2006) (using an example showing how in “announcing its support for a 
federal constitutional amendment . . ., the Bush campaign sought to mobilize its conservative 
base”). 
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these campaigns give movements unique freedom and time to 
develop novel constitutional positions. My claim is that social 
movements should view these campaigns as one of several valuable 
tools to be used to change the meaning of constitutional precedents. 
In Part IIIA, by studying the pro-life struggle for a Human Life 
Amendment between 1973 and 1985, I explore the advantages and 
disadvantages of Article V campaigns as tools for change. In Part 
IIIB, I examine how new constitutional arguments emerge from 
Article V campaigns. In studying the litigation of Cruzan, I analyze 
how these new claims impact subsequent litigation. 
A. Time and Freedom in Article V Campaigns 
The role of amendment campaigns most often acknowledged 
involves the provocation of constitutional conflict and the 
mobilization of movement support.45 As Reva Siegel has explained, 
“[o]utside the courthouse, the Constitution’s text plays a significant 
role in eliciting and focusing normative disputes among Americans 
about . . . the Constitution.”46 
The history of the Human Life model demonstrates the unique 
value of Article V campaigns in mobilizing movement members who 
disapprove of a constitutional decision. In 1973, when the National 
Right to Life Committee held its annual meeting, attendance had 
more than tripled since the previous year.47 The meeting was 
committed to overruling Roe v. Wade, and as Nick Thimmesch, a 
contemporary political commentator, noted, “[t]he political thrust of 
the National Right to Life organization now center[ed] around a 
‘Human Life Amendment’ . . . .”48 
Beginning in the spring of 1973, the movement focused its 
efforts on passing the Buckley Amendment that would guarantee the 
right to life supposedly destroyed by Roe.49 The Buckley Amendment 
 
 45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 46. Siegel, supra note 44, at 314. Siegel has also contended that constitutional text 
enables and encourages popular movements and citizens to make claims about the 
Constitution. See id. at 297–306. 
 47. Nick Thimmesch, Right to Life Fights for Human Values, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 
1973, at A6. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Foes of Abortion Changing Focus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1975, at 37 
(explaining that New York state pro-life activists were focusing on the passage of a Federal 
Human Life Amendment); Janis Johnson, Abortion Foes Vow Intensified Fight, WASH. POST, 
July 2, 1976, at A9 (describing focus of national organizations). 
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called for overruling Roe and chastised the Court for failing to 
recognize a constitutional right to life.50 
Between 1974 and 1985, the Amendment certainly mobilized 
pro-life activists and provoked constitutional debate about the 
meaning and propriety of Roe, as Siegel’s theory would predict. By 
1974, on the anniversary of Roe’s decision, pro-life activists 
presented a petition with three million signatures calling for 
ratification of the Buckley Amendment.51 Although the pro-life 
movement struggled to keep national attention on a Human Life 
Amendment between 1976 and 1980,52 the repeatedly revived 
Amendment still helped to motivate pro-life advocates and to 
organize their claims.53 In January 1980, as many as 54,000 
participants in the annual March for Life again focused their 
demands on formal constitutional change.54 In that year, prominent 
politicians such as Orrin Hatch, Gordon Humphrey, Ron Paul, and 
Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan spoke or 
submitted statements in favor of an amendment.55 
Over time, however, as it became clear that the Human Life 
Amendment would not be ratified,56 alternative reasons for pursuing 
Article V campaigns emerged. My claim is that, because Article V 
campaigns do not require consideration of the scope of congressional 
authority to pass a law or demand analysis of the meaning of extant 
 
 50. See, e.g., J.C. Willke, What Did Roe and Doe Really Say?, THE NAT’L RIGHT TO 
LIFE NEWS, Apr. 27, 1989, at 8. 
 51. See Marjorie Hyer, Abortion, Congress, Churches, Convictions, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 
1974, at 56. 
 52. Neither candidate in the 1976 election endorsed a Human Life Amendment. See, 
e.g., Nick Thimmesch, No Sidestepping on Abortion Issue, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 2, 1976, at A4 
(explaining that Jimmy Carter opposed any constitutional amendment, while Gerald Ford 
supported an amendment giving states the ability to decide the issue of abortion). 
 53. Abortion is Issue for Constitution, GOP Chief Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1977, at A7 
(reporting that there were at least fifteen resolutions before the House Judiciary Committee 
concerning abortion); Martin Waldron, ERA and Abortion Face Senate Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
5, 1976, at 394 (reporting that no vote on an amendment had been set on the New Jersey 
senate calendar). 
 54. See, e.g., infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Leslie Bennetts, Thousands March in Capital Seeking Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 1980, at A12. 
 56. By September 1981, Orrin Hatch, one of the sponsors of a constitutional 
amendment to overrule Roe, noted that the prospects for passing a Human Life Amendment 
appeared dim, because pro-life activists “just [did not] have the votes to do it.” Leslie 
Bennetts, Antiabortion Forces in Disarray Less than a Year After Victory in Election, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1981, at B5. 
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precedent, those struggles offer movements unique freedom to 
imagine constitutional rights or interpretations of judicial decisions 
differently from the way the Court does. When given this 
independence, movements have room to explore different 
articulations of a right. At the same time, they may find freedom to 
disagree and may have to confront conflicts between members with 
radically different constitutional proposals. Protracted, even 
ultimately unsuccessful Article V struggles allow movements time to 
confront and explore the strengths and weaknesses of competing 
interpretations of a judicial decision. 
Such was the case with the Human Life Amendment. During the 
campaign for its passage, the pro-life movement had time to consider 
different arguments about what it would mean to overrule Roe. Of 
course, there were drawbacks to pursuing change through the Article 
V process: the pro-life movement could not overcome the procedural 
obstacles presented by the Article V process.57 However, in the years 
between 1974 and 1981, the movement was also able to explore 
different constitutional interpretations of the right to life “ignored” 
by Roe and to settle strong disagreements within the movement 
about the shape that right should take. 
The first major disagreement to emerge within the pro-life 
movement involved the effect that a constitutional right to life would 
have on the legality of contraception. This division became apparent 
at a spring 1974 Senate hearing on the Buckley Amendment, as 
different pro-life leaders attacked Roe’s holding as to when life 
began.58 All the witnesses were united in calling for an amendment 
to overrule Roe and to recognize a right to life “from fertilization to 
natural death . . . .”59 Randy Engel of the U.S. Coalition for Life 
 
 57. Most often, critics note that amendments must normally be adopted by 
supermajorities in Congress and then ratified by three-quarters of the states. See, e.g., Eskridge 
& Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 1271. For a comparative analysis of the Article V Amendment 
process, see Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING 
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 
248–49, 254–67 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
 58. See Abortion II: Hearing on S. 119 and S. 130 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 93d 
Congress 527–28 (1974) (statement of Dr. Thomas Hilgers, chief resident in 
obstetrics/gynecology, Medical College of Toledo, Ohio) (explaining that IUDs would violate 
a constitutional right to life). 
 59. See, e.g., Abortion III: Hearing on S. 119 and S. 130 Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. 
on Constitutional Amendments, 93d Congress 103 (1974) (statement of Pat Golz, 
International President Feminists for Life); Abortion III: Hearing on S. 119 and S. 130 Before 
the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments, 93d Congress 93 (1974) 
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explained that an amendment would ban “surgical abortion” as well 
as intra-uterine devices and contraceptive pills, because “[a]bortion 
by any other name [was] still” abortion.60 Warren Schaller of 
American Citizens Concerned for Life asserted that overruling Roe 
would not affect any method of contraception that did not “destroy 
a newly conceived life or deny that new life its proper 
environment.”61 
This rift deepened in the next five years. In October 1981, the 
Senate began hearing testimony on the so-called Hatch Amendment 
to the Constitution.62 It stated that “‘a right to abortion [was] not 
secured by this Constitution’” and gave the Congress and the states 
“‘the concurrent power to restrict and prohibit abortion.’”63 
However, when discussion of the amendment began again, different 
members of the pro-life coalition advanced conflicting versions.64 
Leaders of the National Right to Life Committee, one of the largest 
and best-established pro-life organizations, explained that a 
constitutional right to life would limit birth control methods “where 
there [was] positive proof of pregnancy” and would permit use of 
those methods for only “non-abortive or life-saving purposes.”65 
As debate about the Hatch Amendment continued, discussion 
about what a constitutional right to life should mean became 
 
[hereinafter Statement of Randy Engel] (statement of Randy Engel, National Director, U.S. 
Coalition for Life). 
 60. See Statement of Randy Engel, supra note 59, at 58–59 (referencing an earlier 
publication of the Pro-Life Reporter). 
 61. See Abortion III: Hearing on S. 119 and S. 130 Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Amendments, 93d Congress 164 (1974) (statement of Warren Schaller, Jr., 
Executive Director, American Citizens Concerned for Life). 
 62. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Senate Panel OKs Antiabortion Amendment, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 1981, at 5. 
Senator Jesse Helms sponsored an alternative amendment creating a paramount right to life 
that would apply from the moment of conception and ban all abortions. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., Constitutional Amendments Related to Abortion: Hearing on S.110 Before 
the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, 97th Congress 1076–79 (1981) [hereinafter 
Statement of James Bopp, Jr.] (statement of James Bopp, Jr., General Counsel, National Right 
to Life Committee) (describing the organization’s proposed constitutional amendment); 
Constitutional Amendments Related to Abortion: Hearing on S. 110 Before the S. Judiciary 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 97th Congress 1181–86 (1981) [hereinafter Statement of Nellie 
Gray] (statement of Nellie Gray, President, March for Life) (describing a different proposal); 
Constitutional Amendments Related to Abortion: Hearing on S. 110 Before the S. Judiciary 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 97th Congress 1242–43 (1981) [hereinafter Statement of David 
O’Steen] (statement of David O’Steen, Director, Committee for a Pro-Life Congress) 
(expressing support for a “states’ rights” Human Life Amendment). 
 65. See Statement of James Bopp, Jr., supra note 64, at 1089–90. 
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increasingly complex. Movement members disagreed about whether 
the Human Life Amendment should establish a hierarchy of 
constitutional rights and should determine that a right to life was 
paramount.66 An equally divisive discussion arose about whether 
overruling Roe should mean that abortion would be illegal even if 
the mother’s life were at risk.67 Yet another division involved 
whether, if Roe were overruled, states would be permitted or 
required to restrict abortion.68 
In addition to the Hatch Amendment,69 Nellie Gray, the leader 
of March for Life, submitted an amendment to overrule Roe by 
creating a right to life that superseded other constitutional rights and 
by requiring bans on abortion even when a mother’s life was at risk.70 
The National Right to Life Committee also offered an amendment 
of its own.71 When the Hatch Amendment was passed by a Senate 
Subcommittee, only a handful of pro-life organizations endorsed it, 
while others supported only amendments requiring states to ban 
abortion.72 
Although pro-life leaders did not agree on a single version of the 
Amendment,73 the Human Life campaign permitted the movement 
to confront and address a range of internal conflicts about what it 
ought to mean to overrule the Court’s decision in Roe. At the same 
 
 66. See Statement of Nellie Gray, supra note 64, at 1182–87 (explaining pro-life 
divisions about whether a right to life should be: (1) mandatory/permissive; (2) paramount); 
see also Statement of James Bopp, Jr., supra note 64, at 1076–79 (describing position of 
National Right to Life Committee that a constitutional right to life would have to establish a 
hierarchy of constitutional rights). 
 67. March for Life took the position that overruling Roe would and should make 
abortion illegal in all cases, even when the mother’s life was at risk. See Statement of Nellie 
Gray, supra note 64, at 1182–87. The National Right to Life Committee, by contrast, drafted 
a human life amendment overruling Roe and permitting abortion to save the life of the mother. 
See Statement of James Bopp, Jr., supra note 64, at 1076–79. 
 68. The Committee for a Pro-Life Congress was among the groups arguing that 
overruling Roe meant only that the issue of abortion regulation should be left to the states. 
Statement of David O’Steen, supra note 64, at 1242. By contrast, leaders of March for Life 
argued that overruling Roe would require states to ban abortion in all cases, even when a 
mother’s life was at risk. See Statement of Nellie Gray, supra note 64, at 1182–87. 
 69. For discussion of the so-called Hatch Amendment, see Statement of David O’Steen, 
supra note 64, at 1242–43. 
 70. See Statement of Nellie Gray, supra note 64, at 1182–87. 
 71. See Statement of James Bopp, Jr., supra note 64, at 1074–89. 
 72. See Anti-abortion Group Backs Hatch Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1981, at A39 
(describing pro-life divisions about the Hatch Amendment). 
 73. For a summary of the different amendments proposed by politicians alone, see 
Human Life Amendments, supra note 5. 
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time, the Amendment offered the pro-life movement important 
freedom to develop constitutional arguments unrelated to the 
Court’s reasoning in Roe. 
And as the history considered here suggests, Article V campaigns 
also offer a relatively low-cost opportunity for movements to explore 
novel ways to change the meaning of judicial decisions and to settle 
bitter internal disputes. By contrast, litigation or legislation 
campaigns may produce enforceable constitutional understandings 
that may not be in a movement’s long-term interest or may seem 
undesirable to a movement in retrospect.74 Because Article V 
campaigns are unlikely to produce immediate constitutional change 
or lead to the ratification of a new constitutional principle, 
movements risk less by experimenting with new constitutional 
arguments. And the freedom for constitutional exploration offered 
by Article V campaigns is unparalleled, because movements in such 
struggles are not bound to consider the scope of congressional 
authority or the meaning of past precedent. 
My claim here is not that Article V amendments are a better 
method of constitutional change-making. Rather, I suggest that 
movements should be aware, as the pro-life movement learned, that 
even unsuccessful Article V campaigns can be important tools in 
changing the meaning of constitutional decisions. 
B. From Article V Campaign to Litigation 
Article V campaigns not only permit movements to rally support 
but also allow them time to work out internal disagreements and to 
face down countermovement attacks. Through protracted Article V 
campaigns, movements can gradually resolve internal disputes on 
narrow constitutional issues and thereby develop precise claims on 
particular constitutional questions that play an important role in 
subsequent litigation campaigns. 
In the case of the Human Life Amendment, the pro-life 
movement slowly and incrementally developed a litigation position 
on the meaning of overruling Roe and what effect that would have 
on statutes about euthanasia and the right to die. In debate about a 
 
 74. For an example, see generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 
(2004) (explaining how, after a political struggle, the anti-classification approach successfully 
proposed by movement attorneys in Loving v. Virginia and McLaughlin v. Florida was used 
against the civil rights movement in cases involving affirmative action and busing). 
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formal amendment, the movement had time and freedom to change 
its claims to address internal disagreements and explore new 
constitutional arguments.  
This effort would prove vitally important in the litigation of 
Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.75 
Following a car accident and resulting complications, Nancy Cruzan 
entered into a persistent vegetative state.76 Believing that their 
daughter would not want to live in her present condition, Cruzan’s 
parents requested that her medical treatment be terminated, arguing 
that Cruzan had a fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment.77 The actual Cruzan decision represented an important 
victory for pro-life advocates, as the Court adopted almost wholesale 
the movement’s arguments about the limits of a potential 
constitutional right to die.78 
In some way, it is possible to view Cruzan as the culmination of 
the Human Life campaign. Important constitutional arguments 
generated by dialogic movement-countermovement conflict about 
the Amendment gained formal constitutional recognition by way of 
the Cruzan Court. However, my claim is not that movements 
should view courts as the best or only endpoint of constitutional 
struggles. Emphasizing that constitutional campaigns are ongoing 
makes us attentive to the ways that movements can and should use 
different strategies to suit the political and social demands of a 
particular moment. 
Consider the example of Cruzan. Arguments about informed 
consent, developed in the Human Life campaign and 
constitutionalized by Cruzan, were imported into pro-life, state-level 
campaigns to introduce “informed consent” laws designed to limit 
the reach of Roe.79 
 
 75. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 76. Id. at 266. 
 77. Id. at 266–67. 
 78. See id. at 278, 280. 
 79. According to the conservative Heritage Foundation, many states passed new 
informed-consent laws in the 1990s. See MICHAEL J. NEW, USING NATURAL EXPERIMENTS TO 
ANALYZE THE IMPACT OF STATE LEGISLATION ON THE INCIDENCE OF ABORTION 2 (Jan. 23, 
2006), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/upload/93160_1.pdf. In 1992, very few 
states had passed informed consent laws; by 2000, twenty-seven states had passed them. Id. 
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1. The emergence of informed consent 
From 1974 to 1990, in facing internal and external conflict 
about the Human Life Amendment, the pro-life movement gradually 
clarified its position on the relationship between a potential right to 
life and issues like physician-assisted suicide. In 1974 Senate 
testimony about the Buckley Amendment, Dr. Mildred Jefferson of 
the National Right to Life Committee asserted that “the aftermath 
of the Supreme Court’s decisions on abortion” witnessed “increased 
efforts to popularize or make acceptable the extermination 
procedures of radical social medicine,” including efforts to introduce 
“passive euthanasia bills.”80 In Jefferson’s view, a right to life would 
contravene any “right to die” legislation, since any related practice, 
including the authorization of living wills, would constitute 
euthanasia.81 In questioning Jefferson, the Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, pro-choice 
Senator Birch Bayh, rejected this position by borrowing the 
decisional-autonomy reasoning of Roe.82 Thus, Bayh opined that a 
right to life would not deny individuals the ability “to make [their] 
own determinations” about end-of-life issues “as long as [those 
individuals were in] command of their capacities.”83 
When hearings resumed about the Hatch Amendment in the fall 
of 1981, pro-choice witnesses continued to emphasize decisional 
autonomy not only when speaking about the right to die but also in 
defending Roe. For example, a position paper submitted by the 
Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights stated that “[e]very person 
. . . must have the freedom to make decisions regarding abortion” 
and called for the availability of abortion so that “competent, moral 
 
 80. Abortion III: Hearing on S.J. Res. 119 and 130 Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Amendments, 93d Cong. 7–13 (1974) [hereinafter Abortion III Hearing] 
(statement of Mildred Jefferson of the National Right to Life Committee). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); see also B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional 
Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 310 
(2007) (describing Roe’s rationale as one based on “decisional autonomy”); Reva B. Siegel, 
The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion 
Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1689 (2008) (explaining that Roe recognized women’s 
decisional autonomy in choosing abortion). 
 83. Abortion III Hearing, supra note 80, at 11. 
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choices [could] be made.”84 Similarly, Dr. Allan Rosenfield of the 
American Public Health Association explained that overruling Roe 
would allow the government to “coerce women to undergo 
unwanted childbirth.”85 
In the 1981 hearings, pro-life witnesses responded by exploring 
how decisional autonomy could be the touchstone of their own 
arguments—not only about a right to life but also about the scope of 
a right to die. In his testimony, pro-life theorist Germain Grisez 
explained that a right to life would respect decisional autonomy and 
ban only “non-voluntary euthanasia.”86 Grisez recognized decisional 
autonomy arguments against the Human Life Amendment.87 In the 
case of a right to die, however, he explained that decisional 
autonomy was irrelevant for “non-competent persons.”88 Through 
movement-countermovement dialogue, decisional autonomy had 
become a prominent feature of pro-life claims about the scope of 
rights to life and rights to die. 
By pursuing an Article V campaign, the pro-life movement 
profited from an opportunity to develop its constitutional position 
over time. The Human Life campaign shows that social movements 
can benefit from the apparent disadvantages of Article V campaigns. 
It may be true that Article V amendment struggles are often 
protracted. However, over the course of these struggles, movements 
have time to resolve internal struggles and consider different 
constitutional interpretations. Article V amendments should not 
likely be expected to achieve immediate success. For this reason, 
however, social movements can explore different constitutional 
positions without immediately responding to political pressure. 
Finally, because Article V campaigns propose formal constitutional 
change, movement-countermovement conflict can emerge from the 
shadow cast by the Court. It is only during such campaigns that 
movements do not need to defer to judicial precedents or worry 
about Congress’s Section Five authority. In its efforts to overrule 
 
 84. Constitutional Amendments Relating to Abortion: Hearing on S.J. Res. 110 Before the 
S. Subcomm. on the Constitution, 97th Cong. 1031, 1036 (1981) (statement of the Religious 
Coalition for Abortion Rights). 
 85. Id. at 1057 (statement of Dr. Allan Rosenfield of the American Public Health 
Association). 
 86. Id. at 801 (statement of Germain Grisez). 
 87. See id. 
 88. Id. at 809, 813. 
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Roe by amendment, the pro-life movement benefited from the 
freedom to create a unified, conflict-tested litigation position. 
2. Litigation benefits 
By the time its attorneys submitted briefs to the Supreme Court 
in Cruzan,89 the movement had developed a unified, conflict-tested 
position that proved very effective at emphasizing that a right to die 
could not extend to incompetent decision-makers. A pro-life brief 
submitted on behalf of Focus on the Family and the Family Research 
Council explained that any right to die “assumes a competent person 
who has the cognitive capacity to make a decision.”90 An amicus 
brief joined by Concerned Women for America, another pro-life 
organization, explained: “Amici . . . do not argue against the right of 
the individual competent patient to participate in medical treatment 
decisions . . . . Amici believe, however, that the instant case does not 
address such issues.”91 
The Cruzan plurality adopted a virtually identical 
understanding.92 The plurality identified a constitutional liberty at 
stake in the case, explaining that past decisions suggested that “a 
competent person ha[d] a constitutionally protected liberty interest 
in refusing unwanted medical treatment.”93 However, the plurality 
also reasoned that such a right depended on the decision-making 
capacity of the individual in question.94 The liberty interest to refuse 
medical treatment did not apply in similar cases, the plurality 
reasoned, because “[a]n incompetent person [was] not able to make 
an informed, voluntary choice.”95 
Cruzan represented an important constitutional change in itself: 
the Court had adopted an enforceable new and limited 
understanding of the scope of a potential constitutional right to 
 
 89. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 90. See Brief of Focus on the Family and Family Research Council as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 3, Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 
261 (1990) (No. 88–1503), 1989 WL 1128132. 
 91. Brief of the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 3, Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 
261 (1990) (No. 88–1503), 1989 WL 1128127. 
 92. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–80. 
 93. Id. at 278. 
 94. Id. at 278–90. 
 95. Id. at 280. 
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die.96 Scholarly accounts often focus on similar constitutional 
decisions that emerge from movement efforts to “contest and shape 
popular beliefs about the Constitution’s original meaning.”97 For 
example, in studying the Supreme Court’s recent decision in District 
of Columbia v. Heller,98 Reva Siegel shows how movement conflict 
about the meaning of the Second Amendment culminated in the 
Court’s decision.99 In Siegel’s view, Heller is a powerful example of 
an opinion that “respects claims and compromises forged in social 
movement conflict.”100 Similarly, in Siegel’s study of constitutional 
sex-discrimination jurisprudence and the ERA, she focuses on the 
ways in which “constitutional culture can channel social movement 
conflict to produce enforceable new understandings of the 
Constitution’s text.”101 
Siegel carefully studies the patterns of exchange between officials 
and citizens and the influence of popular conflict on the reasoning 
used by the Court.102 However, in emphasizing the emergence of 
enforceable new understandings, Siegel’s work focuses on how 
dialogic contests between movements result in the adoption of new 
constitutional understandings by the Court.103 
If we place less emphasis on the Court’s enforcement of new 
constitutional interpretations, we can better understand that 
campaigns for constitutional change are rarely linear and do not 
always end with a judicial decision. Instead, these campaigns require 
social movements to move comfortably between legislation, 
litigation, and amendment campaigns. In the Human Life campaign, 
 
 96. Cf. Siegel, supra note 1, at 1323 (explaining how the Court channels movement-
countermovement conflict into enforceable new constitutional understandings). 
 97. Reva Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 191, 194 (2008). Cf. L.A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and 
Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 866 (2005) (“Forcing the Court to change its 
mind . . . would seem to be the most likely mechanism through which the people could 
control constitutional law.”). 
 98. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). Striking down a District of Columbia ordinance 
prohibiting most residents from owning handguns, Heller held that the Second Amendment 
extended an individual right to bear arms. Id. at 2788–822.  
 99. Siegel emphasizes the history of movement-countermovement conflict to 
“illustrate[] how contest[s] over the Constitution’s meaning can endow courts with authority 
to change the way they interpret its provisions.” Siegel, supra note 97, at 193. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Siegel, supra note 1, at 1369. 
 102. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 103. See, e.g., supra notes 99, 101 and accompanying text. 
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for example, the pro-life movement alternated between Article V 
efforts, litigation struggles, and legislative proposals, carrying over its 
claims about informed consent and decisional autonomy into its 
legislative campaigns in the 1990s.104 
After developing powerful informed-consent arguments in the 
Human Life campaign, the pro-life movement could effectively stress 
decisional autonomy in these statutory campaigns. In defending such 
statutes in the summer of 1992, Ann Philburn of the pro-life 
National Right to Life Committee drew on arguments forged in the 
Human Life struggle, explaining the movement’s position that “a 
woman should have the right to know the risks of abortion and the 
alternatives to it before making a decision that can’t be reversed.”105 
Texas state legislator Warren Chism, the sponsor of a 1993 
informed-consent measure in that state, also argued that his bill was 
intended to “protect women” and their ability to make independent 
decisions.106 
The Human Life Amendment campaign afforded the pro-life 
movement a chance to experiment with claims about the scope of 
rights to life and rights to die. Over time, the movement worked to 
resolve internal disputes about the meaning of a new constitutional 
right to life. One dispute involved the relationship between rights to 
life and physician-assisted suicide. In dialogic exchanges with pro-life 
advocates about the scope of a right to die, pro-life activists gradually 
began focusing on the importance of voluntary, competent choices. 
The movement’s new claims about decisional autonomy played a 
prominent role in the successful litigation of Cruzan. By allowing 
the movement important time and freedom to experiment with 
different arguments, the Human Life Amendment campaign played a 
crucial role in the emergence of these claims. 
 
 104. See, e.g., infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. Informed-consent abortion 
restrictions took a variety of forms, but most required physicians to provide women with 
information about the condition of a fetus, the dangers of abortion, or alternatives to it. For an 
example of such a provision, see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 904–06 
(1992). These statutes were not new in the 1990s. Indeed, the Supreme Court addressed a 
challenge to one such informed-consent provision as early as 1976, in Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65–67 (1976). Nevertheless, many more states adopted 
these type of statutes in this period. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 105. Martha Shirk, How Pennsylvania’s Law Affects Abortion Rights: Are Restrictions Just 
“Common Sense” or an “Undue Burden”?, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, July 5, 1992, at 1B. 
 106. Ross Ramsey, Bid to Require Abortion Delay Fails in House, HOUS. CHRON., May 
18, 1993, at 9. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009 10:05 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
990 
What can the Human Life model tell us about the way that 
movements change the meaning of constitutional precedents? First, 
the history considered here shows the value of being more attentive 
to different models of constitutional change. The transformation of 
legal doctrine may provide the clearest evidence of constitutional 
change, but we should not see those doctrinal transformations as the 
endpoints of constitutional campaigns. Instead, movements should 
use tools like legislative or amendment campaigns in complex, 
strategically sophisticated ways. 
IV. FOCA AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE BY LEGISLATION 
If, as I have argued, social movements should use different 
constitutional strategies in varying combinations at different times, 
what are the advantages and disadvantages of using those tools in 
different ways? How do Article V campaigns compare to other 
strategies? In this Part, I approach these questions by studying an 
alternative model used by social movements, one that emerged from 
pro-choice legislative efforts in the early 1990s to codify Roe and 
guarantee strong protections for abortion.107 
Movements can use legislation in a number of different ways to 
change the meaning of a judicial decision. Groups may sponsor 
legislation that purports to overrule all or part of a constitutional 
decision, as did a coalition of civil liberties and religious 
organizations calling for the overruling of the Supreme Court’s 1990 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith.108 In other instances, 
movements offer legislation that supposedly resolves constitutional 
questions “intentionally” left open by the Court.109 The pro-life 
movement used this technique in the early 1980s, when fighting for 
a bill ostensibly answering questions left open in Roe about when 
 
 107. For a contemporary version of FOCA, see The Freedom of Choice Act of 1989: 
Hearing on H.R. 3700 Before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 
101st Cong. 2–4 (1990) (text of FOCA as of October 1990). 
 108. For coverage of the legislative campaign to overrule Smith, see Darrell Turner, 
Groups Attack the Decision Curtailing Religious Freedoms, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 6, 
1991, at 3E. In rejecting a free-exercise challenge to a state policy barring the use of 
sacramental peyote, Smith held that the First Amendment does not require exceptions for 
religious objectors to neutral rules of general applicability. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human 
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–88 (1990). 
 109. See, e.g., David Farrell, Anti-Abortionists Pushing the Battle in Congress, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1981, at 1. 
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human life began.110 However, for many in the pro-choice 
movement, the codification of Roe meant a change from the 
constitutional status quo: a statutory overruling of the Court’s recent 
decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services111 and the creation 
of abortion rights broader than those spelled out in Roe.112 
What are the consequences of using a statute like FOCA to 
change the meaning of a constitutional decision? Unlike a formal 
amendment, a statute proposed for this purpose has a chance of 
passing.113 However, the chance of success may bring its own set of 
constraints. If a statute is reasonably likely to be signed into law, a 
movement and its political allies have to avoid any serious risk that 
the Supreme Court will find the law to be beyond the scope of 
Congress’s power. When offering different interpretations of 
constitutional precedent, a movement has to operate in the shadow 
of the Court, careful not to raise questions about congressional 
authority.114 
Moreover, there are pragmatic, political considerations that 
weigh equally heavily on movements. In order to win congressional 
allies and popular support, movement activists have to present their 
constitutional positions in politically attractive ways in order to 
secure the votes necessary to pass a particular bill. 
However, a movement can benefit from the rapidly developing 
internal divisions and countermovement challenges that characterize 
legislative campaigns like the one for FOCA. These political 
pressures can help a movement by forcing it to test and develop 
convincing new constitutional claims. In the case of FOCA, the pro-
choice movement created new constitutional arguments in the face 
of deep internal rifts about the best interpretation of Roe. The 
movement also had to structure its claims to address pro-life 
 
 110. See, e.g., id. 
 111. 492 U.S. 490, 507, 511–13 (1989) (plurality decision).  
 112. See Freedom of Choice Act of 1989: Hearings before the Comm. on Labor & Human 
Resources, United States Senate, 101st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings]; NOW, Freedom 
of Choice Act of 1991, Draft (Feb. 1991), in THE NOW PAPERS (MC 496, Box 91, Folder 
15, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univ.) [hereinafter The Freedom of Choice Act Draft]. 
 113. See Ackerman, supra note 43, at 1742 (arguing that future constitutional changes 
will not likely be accomplished by formal amendment). 
 114. For arguments about how judicial reasoning and rhetoric constrain congressional 
freedom to discuss constitutional rights, see generally GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: 
HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES AND KILLS POLITICS (2008); see also Neal Devins, 
Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 435, 444–45 (2001) (arguing that Congress sees itself as subordinate to the Court.). 
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questions about the constitutionality of the legislation. These 
conflicts allowed the pro-choice movement quickly to create new 
claims that figured prominently in the successful litigation of Casey. 
My exploration of the FOCA model unfolds in two steps. In Part 
IVA, I develop an account of the costs involved in legislative efforts 
to change the meaning of constitutional precedents. In Part IVB, by 
considering the constitutional arguments that emerged from 
movement conflict about FOCA and figured prominently in the 
litigation of Casey, I study the power of campaigns like FOCA to 
create constitutional change. 
A. The Costs of Legislation 
In changing the meaning of a judicial decision through 
legislation, a social movement attempts a series of complex balancing 
acts: weighing the need for freedom to create politically appealing 
arguments and concern about Supreme Court intervention, 
considering internal conflicts and external challenges, and dealing 
with a need for votes and a commitment to constitutional principles. 
What reasons would a movement have to change the meaning of a 
constitutional precedent through legislation? The history of FOCA 
offers several answers. 
Interest in using legislation to change the meaning of Roe began 
in 1988, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services.115 Webster involved a constitutional 
challenge to a multi-restriction Missouri abortion statute,116 but 
many—including the Bush Administration, which filed an amicus 
brief asking the Court to reject Roe once and for all117—viewed the 
case as an opportunity for the Court to overrule Roe.118 
As the pro-choice movement demonstrated in 1988, movements 
can use similar legislative campaigns to show the Court that the 
people demand a particular constitutional outcome. As Molly Yard, 
Eleanor Smeal, and Patricia Ireland of NOW explained in April 
 
 115. 492 U.S. 490; see March for Women’s Equality/Women’s Lives (Dec. 9, 1988), in 
THE NOW PAPERS (MC 496, Box 91, Folder 25, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univ.) 
[hereinafter March] (exploring alternative ways to protect Roe). 
 116. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 500 (1989). 
 117. See March, supra note 115, at 1 (mentioning the Bush Administration’s call for 
Roe’s reversal).  
 118. See, e.g., James Kilpatrick, The End May Be Near for Roe v. Wade, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 
31, 1989, at A20. 
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1989, popular protests and political shows of strength would 
demonstrate to the Court that “a cross section of America [was 
willing to come] to the nation’s capital to stand up and be counted 
on abortion rights.”119 In pursuing measures like FOCA, Yard 
argued, the pro-choice movement showed that it would “speak with 
one voice to the Bush Administration, the Supreme Court, and the 
Congress” in asking that abortion be “ke[pt] legal.”120 
The Supreme Court’s September 1989 decision in Webster 
pushed the movement to develop new ideas about how legislation 
could be used to change the meaning of Webster and Roe. On a 
superficial level, Webster was uncontroversial: the Court refused to 
rule on the constitutionality of a statutory preamble defining the 
beginning of human life121 and held moot a question concerning the 
statute’s prohibition on publicly-funded abortions.122 The issue 
decided by the Court—that it was constitutional to prevent public 
employees or facilities from being used in the performance of 
abortions123—seemed to be a straightforward application of the 
Court’s earlier precedents.124 More controversially, however, in 
upholding the statute’s definition of fetal viability, a plurality called 
for the overruling of Roe’s trimester framework.125 Writing in dissent, 
Justice Blackmun claimed that the forecast for abortion rights was 
bleak: 
Thus, “not with a bang, but a whimper,” the plurality discards a 
landmark case of the last generation, and casts into darkness the 
hopes and visions of every woman in this country who had come to 
believe that the Constitution guaranteed her the right to exercise 
some control over her unique ability to bear children.126 
After the 1989 decision of Webster, pro-choice leaders offered a 
different understanding of FOCA: as an alternative to the judicial 
protection of abortion rights. For example, Sharon Rodine of the 
 
 119. See NOW National Board to NOW Chapter Presidents (Dec. 5, 1988), in THE 
NOW PAPERS, (MC 496, Box 91, Folder 25, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univ.). 
 120. See id. 
 121. Webster, 492 U.S. at 507. 
 122. Id. at 513. 
 123. Id. at 511. 
 124.  Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 
(1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980). 
 125. Webster, 492 U.S. at 517–18. 
 126.  Id. at 557 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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National Women’s Political Caucus claimed in September 1989 that 
Webster “proved . . . [that] the only real protection for women’s 
reproductive rights [was] political power.”127 As Ira Glasser of the 
ACLU asserted in September 1989, “[w]hen the Supreme Court 
[failed] to guarantee . . . fundamental rights,” “political struggle” 
was necessary to “restore those rights.”128 
When the Supreme Court has proven hostile to a movement’s 
position, there is a clear reason for it to seek protection in another 
arena. As the history of FOCA shows, however, movements seeking 
legislative solutions are limited by the rules governing congressional 
authority. 
B. Arguing About Constitutional Authority 
When debate on FOCA began in the spring of 1990, constraints 
on congressional authority quickly became the center of discussion, 
when Representative Henry Hyde was testifying against the Act.129 
At first, Hyde focused on criticizing the constitutional justification 
for abortion rights.130 Senator Orrin Hatch, another opponent, 
refocused discussion, noting that the bill “went further” than that 
decision.131 Hyde agreed with Hatch that FOCA provided broader 
protections than had been available through Roe.132 
In April 1990, the National Right to Life Committee elaborated 
on this argument in a memo submitted to Congress.133 In it, James 
Bopp, Jr., and Douglas Johnson argued that the Act was illegitimate 
partly because it would invalidate restrictions upheld under Roe, 
including parental-consultation, informed-consent, conscience-
 
 127. See Statement of Sharon Rodine, National Women’s Political Caucus (Sept. 6, 
1989), in THE NOW PAPERS (MC 496, Box 91, Folder 25, Schlesinger Library, Harvard 
Univ.). 
 128. See Statement of Ira Glasser, ACLU (Sept. 7, 1989), in THE NOW PAPERS (MC 
496, Box 91, Folder 25, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univ.). 
 129. Hearings, supra note 112, at 33–35 (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde). 
 130. See id. (“[N]obody has the right to choose when the choice involves the destruction 
of someone else’s rights.”). 
 131. See id. at 38–40. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See Douglas Johnson, “Freedom of Choice Act” Would Mandate Legal Abortion 
Throughout Pregnancy, Say NRLC Legal Experts, THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Apr. 
19, 1990, at 1 (The National Right to Life News Collection, Schlesinger Library, Harvard 
Univ.).  
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clause, and waiting-period laws.134 Johnson and Bopp claimed that 
FOCA would “exceed Roe” by “mandat[ing] abortion on demand 
throughout pregnancy.”135 By October 1990, pro-life senators had 
taken up the argument made by Bopp and Johnson.136 For example, 
Wisconsin Representative James Sensenbrenner claimed that, in 
passing FOCA, Congress would “overrule the Supreme Court 
decisions . . . in the name of upholding Roe v. Wade.”137 Like 
Sensenbrenner, pro-life activists argued that Congress lacked the 
constitutional authority to pass FOCA under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,138 the scope of which had been most 
recently discussed in the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan.139 
In responding to these pro-life attacks, the pro-choice movement 
had to change its interpretations of Roe to account for limits on 
congressional authority. In October 1990, Senator Robert 
Packwood, one of the original sponsors of the Act, responded to 
Hyde and Hatch’s criticisms by stating that the Act would 
“guarantee nationwide the rights that a woman had under Roe v. 
Wade—no more, no less.”140 The following February, NOW began 
circulating promotional material explaining that the Act accurately 
interpreted Roe.141 Indeed, NOW claimed that the Act only 
“codif[ied] the principles established in the 1973 Roe v. Wade 
decision.”142 By early 1992, pro-choice activists could not campaign 
for FOCA without claiming to be interpreting Roe. For example, 
Representative Don Edwards, one of the key House sponsors of the 
Act, wrote in The New York Times in April 1992 that the purpose of 
FOCA was only to codify Roe.143 
 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See, e.g., Maben, supra note 7, at 3. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Freedom Choice Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 101st Cong. 65–86 (1990) [hereinafter 
1990 Hearings] (statement of James Bopp, Jr., prominent pro-life attorney). 
 139. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 140. See Hearings, supra note 112, at 24 (statement of Sen. Robert Packwood). 
 141. See The Freedom of Choice Act Draft, supra note 112, at 1. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Rep. Don Edwards, Letter to the Editor, Freedom of Choice Bill Protects Women, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1993, at A20. 
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The history of FOCA illustrates the constraints that limit the 
value of similar legislative measures in changing the meaning of 
constitutional precedents. Bills like FOCA are attractive partly 
because they promise social movements the freedom to voice 
constitutional interpretations unlike those set out by the Court.144 
However, because legislation like FOCA may stand a chance of 
being signed into law, countermovements force their opponents to 
incorporate constraints on congressional authority into their 
arguments about the Constitution. 
As the FOCA example shows, legislative campaigns to change 
the meaning of constitutional decisions take place in the shadow of 
the Court. Countermovement members can use the possibility of 
Supreme Court intervention not only to argue against the passage of 
a law but also to force their opponents to moderate their arguments 
and demands. Over time, a movement may lose its freedom to offer 
novel constitutional positions because its members have internalized 
constraints on congressional authority and put forth only arguments 
that take those constraints into account. 
C. Practical Limitations 
For social movements pursuing similar campaigns, there are 
political as well as legal constraints on the freedom to develop new 
understandings of the Constitution. Believing it possible to pass such 
legislation, some movement leaders and political allies demand that 
members avoid any argument that could reduce a bill’s chance of 
success. By making a movement seem disorganized and politically 
weak, the appearance of internal divisions may itself discourage a 
bill’s potential supporters. If rifts run deep enough, different political 
allies of a movement may offer alternative versions of a bill, dividing 
supporters so that no single version has the votes to pass. Finally, as 
movements and countermovements compete for the support of 
politicians, each side is pressured to modify its claim to suit 
undecided legislators. 
Movement members may be forced to discard constitutional 
positions that would result in the loss of valuable votes. Even when 
some movement members remain willing to state controversial 
constitutional claims, pragmatists draw them into dialogic contests 
and reshape and moderate the arguments of absolutists within the 
 
 144. See, e.g., supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
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movement. In trying to use pragmatists’ arguments against them, 
dissenters may try to show that their own arguments are practical 
and politically reasonable. The absolutists’ new arguments may often 
be not only more responsive to their opponents’ claims but also 
more similar to them. 
The history of FOCA illustrates the extent to which political 
pressures limit a movement’s ability to offer novel constitutional 
arguments. The force of these constraints can be better understood if 
one examines the strategic battles waged within the pro-choice 
movement. 
D. The First Pro-Choice Rift 
The outlines of one such strategic battle were already apparent in 
the summer of 1992, when Casey was still pending. Between 1989 
and 1990, absolutists had wielded considerable power within the 
pro-choice coalition championing FOCA. At a January 1990 
NARAL Congressional Briefing, for example, Representative Don 
Edwards, one of the most prominent supporters of FOCA, explained 
that the Act would allow “no exceptions” on a woman’s right to 
choose abortion.145 NOW also took an absolutist position on 
FOCA.146 At a December 1989 meeting of the NOW National 
Board of Directors, the Board voted to designate members of 
Congress as pro-choice only if they supported FOCA and separate 
legislation guaranteeing public funding for abortion and prohibiting 
the introduction of parental-notification and consent laws.147 
Senator George Mitchell’s bill reflected a different strategy in 
protecting Roe. According to this view, a narrow abortion right 
could still be politically significant and personally meaningful to 
women. As Mitchell told the Houston Chronicle in June 1992: “[w]e 
do not allow states to broadly restrict other constitutional rights.”148 
In Mitchell’s view, FOCA sent an important message that abortion 
rights were “no less fundamental to women” and were consequently 
 
 145. See 1990 Hearings, supra note 138, at 66–68 (statement of James Bopp, Jr., quoting 
Rep. Edwards).  
 146. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 147. See NOW Nat’l Board Meeting Minutes (Dec. 1989), in THE NOW PAPERS (MC 
496, Box 6, Folder 41, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univ.).  
 148. Nancy Mathis, Court Limits Access to Abortion, HOUS. CHRON., June 30, 1992, at 
1. 
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“deserv[ing of] the same protection.”149 More concretely, in 
adopting an equal-protection rationale for Section Five authority, 
Congress would recognize what Reva Siegel has called a sex equality 
rationale for abortion rights, one that acknowledged that 
reproductive autonomy was central to women’s political, economic, 
and social equality.150 As Laurence Tribe explained in his March 
1992 congressional testimony, even an amended FOCA would be 
valuable in recognizing that: 
[y]ou can be armed with all the ballots you want and all the 
franchise in the world [. . .in] a system that harasses you and takes 
control of your body[. . .but] you may not be much better off than 
somebody who is excluded from the polling booth when it comes 
to making full use of . . . opportunity . . . under the law.151 
In addition to providing a guaranteed minimum level of protection 
for abortion rights, the statute would call attention to a particular 
justification for abortion rights. If such an act were passed, citizens 
debating abortion rights would be more likely to discuss this 
rationale and, perhaps, to accept it.152 
As the history of FOCA shows, political pressures brought to 
bear in legislative change campaigns encourage movements to voice 
only those constitutional positions likely to win votes. A movement 
may push its allies to suppress constitutional interpretations that 
seem radical or outside the mainstream, since those interpretations 
may cost the movement the support of moderates. Even when 
movement dissenters continue to speak out, they will do so in a 
dialogue with the majority faction of the movement. In turn, that 
dialogue will reshape the positions taken by both sides. In this way, 
strategic pressures place meaningful limits on a movement’s ability to 
explore and set out new constitutional claims. 
 
 149. Id.  
 150. See Reva Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis 
and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 817–19 (2007). 
 151. The Freedom of Choice Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 25 Before the H. Judiciary 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 102d Cong. 14 (1992) [hereinafter Statement of 
Laurence Tribe] (statement of Laurence Tribe). 
 152. This effect would be comparable to what political science literature calls a framing 
effect. Well-documented in political-science and sociology scholarship, framing effects occur 
when “public opinion . . . is shaped by . . . constructions or definitions of social problems and 
policy solutions.” Thomas Nelson, Policy Goals, Public Rhetoric, and Political Attitudes, 66 J. 
POL. 581, 582 (2004). 
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1. The second pro-choice rift: funding and abortion 
As an example of how forceful these political pressures can be, 
consider the 1993 debate within the pro-choice movement about the 
use of Medicaid funding for abortions.153 In July 1993, the House 
Appropriations Committee again took up debate about the Hyde 
Amendment, which had restricted the use of Medicaid for abortions 
unless a woman had been a victim of rape or incest or unless her life 
was threatened.154 Most FOCA supporters, even absolutists like those 
in NOW, had accepted that FOCA would permit states to prohibit 
the public funding of abortion, because they believed that the 
subject would be covered by separate legislation, such as the 
proposed Reproductive Health Equity Act.155 On July 1, to the 
surprise of many pro-choice activists, the full House voted 255-178 
in favor of a restrictive version of the Hyde Amendment, signaling 
that public funding for abortion would not be guaranteed by any 
legislation in that congressional session.156 At a press conference after 
the vote, Senator Carol Moseley-Braun announced that she was 
withdrawing support for FOCA, because a true codification of Roe 
would require public funding for abortion and would not, like 
FOCA, sanction a two-tier system of abortion that penalized poor 
women.157 Moseley-Braun claimed that support for abortion rights 
was not consistent with allowing the state to “discriminate[] against 
young and poor women.”158 In Moseley-Braun’s opinion, Roe 
demanded both gender equality and equal treatment for poor or 
non-white women and did not permit politicians to “trade[] off the 
rights of some women for the promise of rights for others.”159 
Pragmatists fired back that passing FOCA would be a necessary 
and important symbolic victory for young and poor women. In July 
1993, Kate Michelman of NARAL wrote in The Washington Post that 
passing FOCA was necessary to show “a real commitment to . . . 
 
 153. For discussion of this conflict, see House Votes to Keep Ban on Abortion Aid, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 1, 1993, at A1. 
 154. See, e.g., id.; see also House Rejects Abortion Funds, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, July 
1, 1993, at A3 [hereinafter House Rejects]. 
 155. See The Freedom of Choice Act Draft, supra note 112. 
 156. See House Rejects, supra note 154, at A3. 
 157. See, e.g., Kevin Merida, Senator Drops Support for Abortion Rights Bill, WASH. POST, 
July 10, 1993, at A3; see also infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 158. Merida, supra note 157. 
 159. Id. 
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true reproductive choice for American women.”160 Representative 
Don Edwards argued that passing FOCA would send a necessary 
message to American women.161 Edwards claimed that Congress 
should convey a view that “the reproductive rights that the freedom 
of choice bill [promised would not] be held hostage” until Congress 
was willing to fund abortions.162 
After two weeks, when movement dissenters and other African-
American congresswomen responded, they no longer emphasized 
concrete protections for poor women but, like their pragmatist 
opponents, stressed the message FOCA would send. Representatives 
Maxine Waters, Carrie Meek, and Cynthia McKinney told The 
Washington Post that they were reconsidering their support for 
FOCA because of the ideas FOCA would convey.163 As McKinney 
explained, some congresswomen agreed with Moseley-Braun that 
FOCA should say that public funding for abortion was “an integral 
part of being pro-choice.”164 NOW joined the National Women’s 
Health Project and the Campaign for Abortion Rights for Everyone 
in calling for the rejection of FOCA if it permitted funding or 
parental-consultation restrictions.165 As Patricia Ireland of NOW 
explained to the Chicago Tribune, “[y]ou can argue that half a loaf is 
better than none, . . . but that’s only true if you’re in the half that is 
getting the loaf.”166 
What does the history of FOCA illustrate about the use of 
legislative measures like FOCA in campaigns to change the meaning 
of constitutional precedents? Certainly, there are political pressures at 
work in Article V campaigns, as well; movement leaders often press 
one another to present their claims in a politically favorable light.167 
But when a movement works for constitutional change through 
 
 160. Kate Michelman, Unwarranted Interference: The Continuing Struggle for Abortion 
Rights, WASH. POST, July 19, 1993, at A15. 
 161. See Edwards, supra note 143, at A20. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Kevin Merida, Drive for Abortion Funding Opens, WASH. POST, July 14, 1993, at 
A3. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Clarence Page, Freedom of Choice May Fall Victim to Divided Forces, CHI. TRIB., 
Aug. 11, 1993, at 17; Edwards, supra note 143, at A20.  
 166. Page, supra note 165, at 17. 
 167. See generally Serena Mayeri, A New ERA or a New Era?: Amendment Advocacy and 
the Reconstitution of Feminism, NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author). 
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legislation, unique constraints shape its arguments and limit its 
freedom to offer constitutional arguments of its own. 
As FOCA shows, strategic and legal pressures associated with 
legislative campaigns limit a movement’s ability to explore and set 
forth innovative constitutional arguments. Countermovements force 
their opponents to explain how a given piece of legislation is within 
Congress’s constitutional authority. In dialogue with their 
opponents, social movements change their arguments to reflect 
limits on congressional authority. In turn, these limits discourage 
movement members trying to voice constitutional interpretations 
different from those already set out by the Court. 
The political pressures that limit movements’ freedom to develop 
new constitutional claims appear not only in conflicts between 
movements but also in internal struggles. In order to pass legislation 
like FOCA, some movement leaders push compromises with 
moderates and try to silence those members who disagree. These 
political pressures apply with special force to those who propose a 
radical change to the meaning of a judicial decision, for these 
absolutists are the most likely to stand outside the constitutional 
mainstream. 
E. Shaping Casey 
If there are real costs to using legislation as a tool for change, 
there are concrete benefits, as well. I explore the nature of these 
benefits by studying the relationship between the FOCA campaign 
and the litigation of Casey. My claim is that the intense political 
pressures, serious movement-countermovement challenges, and the 
relatively brief time frame associated with campaigns like the one for 
FOCA allow movements to rapidly develop precise, conflict-tested 
claims. In turn, these claims may prove beneficial in subsequent 
litigation. 
Casey involved a constitutional challenge to a multi-restriction 
Pennsylvania abortion statute.168 However, movement attorneys on 
both sides described the case as a referendum on Roe’s continuing 
validity.169 James Bopp, Jr. of the National Right to Life Committee 
 
 168. The challenged statute included spousal-consent, informed-consent, parental-
consultation, and waiting-period restrictions. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
 169. See David Savage, Supreme Court Case Puts Right to Abortion on Trial, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 1992, at 1. 
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argued that if the Justices “agree[d] abortion [was] no longer a 
‘fundamental right,’ . . . . Roe vs. Wade [would] be gone.”170 
Kathryn Kolbert of the ACLU concurred that “[t]he court [was] 
likely to use [the] case to abolish the fundamental constitutional 
rights to abortion.”171 
When the Casey Court voted not to overrule Roe, arguments 
from the FOCA debates figured prominently in its decision. The 
movement-countermovement struggles that defined the FOCA 
debates proved to be an important test for the pro-choice 
movement’s arguments in Casey about the role of Roe and the 
Supreme Court in American politics. 
1. Reliance 
The first argument that emerged from the FOCA debates 
involved women’s reliance on Roe.172 In the juridical arena, reliance-
based arguments had long played an important role in the courts’ 
stare decisis analysis.173 However, in the early 1990s, the Supreme 
Court had recognized such reliance interests only in the context of 
commerce, and often when one party could point to a particular 
contractual guarantee on which she relied.174 
In the political arena in the late 1980s, NOW led efforts to 
redefine which reliance interests were deserving of constitutional 
recognition. At first, reliance arguments were inextricably linked to 
claims about popular support for Roe. In the lead-up to the March 
for Women’s Equality/Women’s Lives, a pro-choice protest 
demonstration, NOW, NARAL, and Planned Parenthood elaborated 
on the argument that women’s political power was itself an adequate 
reason for the Court not to overrule Roe.175 In December 1988 
materials promoting the March, NOW explained: 
We are determined . . . to send a message to the White House, the 
Congress, and yes, the U.S. Supreme Court that we won’t go 
back . . . . Our government—all three branches—has to understand 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856–57. 
 173. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
 174. See id.; accord Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); The Genesee 
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 458 (1852). 
 175. See, e.g., Model Letter (Dec. 5, 1988), in THE NOW PAPERS (MC 496, Box 91, 
Folder 25, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univ.). 
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that American women will not docilely return to an era of 
compulsory pregnancy.176 
The message sent by the March was that the Supreme Court should 
not overrule Roe because popular opinion demanded that Roe stay 
the law. March organizers also emphasized why women would not 
“go back” to an era like the one before the decision of Roe. For 
example, Patricia Baker, Executive Director of Planned Parenthood, 
explained that women had extremely strong reliance interests in the 
availability of legalized abortion.177 Indeed, Baker argued, Roe had 
been the central “women’s issue” of the past several decades, because 
“the abortion guarantees of Roe v. Wade [had] been in existence 
since 1973.”178 
After the FOCA debates began in May 1990, supporters of the 
bill started describing women’s reliance interests as an independent 
justification for preserving Roe. These proponents were motivated to 
do so partly because, as the rift in the pro-choice coalition appeared, 
it became more difficult for absolutist pro-choice activists to argue 
that a majority of Americans supported their interpretation of Roe.179 
By July 1993, Senator George Wise, a leading supporter of FOCA, 
acknowledged that “a number of people believe[d] in the right to 
choose with some reasonable limitations.”180 Representative Don 
Edwards had written in The New York Times that “[a] majority in 
Congress believe[d] states should be able to require parental 
involvement . . . .”181 In defending their position, absolutists had to 
explain how women’s reliance interests justified broad protections 
for abortion rights, irrespective of the popular or congressional 
support for those protections.182 
In making this argument, absolutists explained how women had 
relied on Roe in making both their economic and educational choices 
 
 176. Id.; see also Mimi Hall, NOW at 25, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 1992, at 1A (members of 
NOW arguing that women’s economic gains and career stability depended on the availability 
of legalized abortion). 
 177. See, e.g., Robert Tomasson, U.S. Action May Renew Abortion Debate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 19, 1992, at A13. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See, e.g., Clymer, supra note 7, at A8. 
 180. Kevin Merida, Abortion Foes Claim Momentum in Congress and in Public Opinion, 
WASH. POST, July 15, 1993, at A17. 
 181. Edwards, supra note 143, at A20. 
 182. See id. 
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and their personal and intimate decisions.183 As Molly Yard, then-
President of NOW, explained in 1991: “Any goal [a woman] sets for 
herself can be completely disrupted by an unplanned pregnancy.”184 
In 1992, Laurence Tribe called on Congress to recognize that 
women who were prevented from controlling their reproductive lives 
“[were] less able . . . to invoke . . . rights . . . to equal 
employment[,] housing[, and] political participation.”185 
As FOCA was generating divisions within the pro-choice 
coalition in Congress, parties and amici in Casey reworked the 
reliance interest arguments that had developed in the political arena. 
An amicus brief submitted by a group of pro-choice state 
governments explained that “[m]illions of women who ha[d] come 
of age in the last twenty years . . . structured their identities, their 
families, and their pursuits around the possession of [the] 
fundamental . . . right to decide.”186 The petitioners’ brief and a brief 
submitted by a group of pro-choice members of Congress described 
women’s reliance interests in similar terms.187 
It was a related account of reliance interests that the Casey Court 
adopted. As the Court explained: 
[P]eople have organized intimate relationships and made choices 
that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in 
reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that 
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been 
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.188 
Casey described reliance interests in a way that reflected the struggle 
of pro-choice activists to define a justification for Roe, reliance 
interests not tied to contractual agreements or legal arrangements 
but related instead to women’s choices, economic opportunities, and 
intimate relationships. 
 
 183. See, e.g., Testimony of Molly Yard, President of the National Organization for Women, 
on the Appointment of David Souter to the United States Supreme Court, 7 (Sept. 18, 1990), in 
THE NOW PAPERS (MC 496, Box 201, Folder 4, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univ.). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Statement of Laurence Tribe, supra note 151, at 26. 
 186. Brief of the State of New York et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
*6, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902). 
 187. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 186, at *22; Brief for Representatives Don 
Edwards et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *13–14, Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902). 
 188. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856. 
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2. Institutional legitimacy 
A second argument central to Casey that emerged from the 
FOCA debates focused on the institutional legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court. Some pro-choice attorneys and amici had hinted at 
a similar argument during the litigation of Webster in the late 1980s. 
For example, a brief submitted by NOW mentioned in passing that 
the Court should not overrule Roe in Webster, because “adherence to 
precedent can reassure society that constitutional questions are 
answered with reference to settled principles rather than in response 
to political considerations.”189 
NOW leader Molly Yard elaborated this argument between 
September 1990 and September 1991 in testifying in opposition to 
the appointments of David Souter and Clarence Thomas to the 
Supreme Court.190 In September 1990, Yard argued against Souter’s 
nomination, accusing the Supreme Court of paying attention not to 
the Constitution but to “the right-wing of [the] country, led by 
President [George H.W.] Bush.”191 One year later, Yard attributed 
the Court’s recent abortion decisions to a “conservative tide” that 
had blinded the Court to its responsibilities to interpret the law 
neutrally.192 NOW and other pro-choice organizations called on 
Congress to be non-partisan at a time when the Court appeared not 
to be.193 
Beginning in 1991, the pro-life movement responded to NOW’s 
call for neutrality by claiming that Congress could be neutral only by 
deferring to the Court, that is, Congress would act the least 
controversially in codifying rather than expanding the right defined 
by Roe.194 Douglas Johnson of the National Right to Life 
Committee told The Washington Post in January 1990 that FOCA 
was illegitimate, because it called into question whether “some of the 
 
 189. Brief for the National Organization for Women as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellees at *20–21, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605); 
see also Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Women Lawyers et al. in Support of 
Appellees at *14–16, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605). 
 190. See infra notes 197–98 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Testimony of Molly Yard, supra note 183. 
 192. See Testimony of Molly Yard, President of the National Organization for Women, 
Against the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court (Sep. 1991), in THE NOW 
PAPERS (MC 496, Box 201, Folder 4, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univ.). 
 193. See, e.g., id. 
 194. See infra notes 201–02 and accompanying text. 
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very minimal regulations that [had] survived Roe v. Wade would 
continue to survive.”195 In March 1992, the Bush Administration 
also criticized the Act for going “well beyond the requirements of 
Roe v. Wade.”196 
Over time, pro-choice activists accepted, to some extent, that 
FOCA would be more politically legitimate if Congress “codified” 
rather than “went beyond” Roe.197 The movement-
countermovement dialogue that shaped the FOCA debate repeatedly 
reinforced the idea that neutrality involved non-action. To go 
beyond Roe or undercut it was argued to be, by extension, 
illegitimate and partisan. 
As hope for passing FOCA faded,198 these arguments were 
channeled back into the juridical arena. An amicus brief submitted in 
Casey by a group of pro-choice members of Congress built on 
political arguments linking unjustifiable partisanship with 
“tampering” with Roe.199 The brief stressed that any “departure from 
precedent after the membership of the Court has been dramatically 
altered” could only “raise doubts both as to the Court’s 
impersonality and as to the principled foundations of its 
decisions.”200 
The Casey Court explicitly endorsed this reasoning. An entire 
section of the opinion was dedicated to explaining “why overruling 
Roe’s central holding would . . . seriously weaken the Court’s 
capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the 
Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law.”201 In 
particular, the Casey Court explained, the Court could not meddle 
with Roe without appearing to be political and partisan.202 Although 
many outside observers thought the Court was being partisan in 
leaving Roe alone, the Court adopted the contrary argument that 
had been advanced in the FOCA debate. “[T]o overrule under fire 
 
 195. Dan Balz, Abortion Rights Strategy: A Move to Thwart the States, WASH. POST, Jan. 
23, 1990, at A23. 
 196. William J. Eaton, Debate Begins on Abortion Rights Bill, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1992, 
at 12. 
 197. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 143, at A20. 
 198. See Clymer, supra note 7, at 27. 
 199. Brief for Representatives Don Edwards et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, supra note 187, at *11. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). 
 202. See id. at 867. 
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in the absence of the most compelling reason,” the Casey Court 
explained, “would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious 
question.”203 
3. Roe’s core holding 
A final claim adopted in Casey—that a sex-equality rationale was 
part of the core holding of Roe204—was drawn from arguments made 
by the pragmatist faction of the pro-choice coalition sponsoring 
FOCA. Of course, as Reva Siegel has shown, sex-equality arguments 
for a constitutional abortion right did not originate during the 
FOCA debate.205 Nonetheless, a particular understanding of Roe as a 
sex-equality decision emerged during discussions of FOCA. 
As divisions in the pro-choice movement became clear in the 
spring of 1992, both absolutists and pragmatists had to explain how 
their positions preserved Roe.206 In accomplishing this task, 
pragmatists like Senator George Mitchell and Kate Michelman of 
NARAL faced serious obstacles. How could one say that Roe had 
been preserved when important restrictions on abortion access were 
permitted? In the FOCA debates, the pragmatists responded that 
there was value in setting forth the justification for abortion rights.207 
In part, this approach was explained as the only politically realistic 
one; while there was widespread popular support for the idea of a 
choice-based abortion right for women, a majority of Americans 
approved of restrictions like parental-consultation laws.208 In June 
1992, Mitchell explained that his interpretation of Roe was intended 
to enhance the chances that FOCA would be passed.209 Don 
Edwards also supported a more restrictive interpretation of Roe, 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. at 845, 852–54. 
 205. See generally Siegel, supra note 150. 
 206. Indeed, NOW activists routinely complained that the pragmatist, or Mitchell bill, 
was “more restrictive” than Roe. See, e.g., NOW National Board Meeting (Apr. 2–4 1990), in 
The NOW Papers (MC 496, Box 91, Folder 53, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univ.). 
 207. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, America’s Longest War; At 20, Roe Conflict Enters New Era, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1993, at A1 (pro-choice congressmen explaining that FOCA could 
permit a variety of state restrictions on abortion rights while still “captur[ing] the essence of 
Roe”). 
 208. See, e.g., Uri Berliner & Jeanne Freeman, For Most, Abortion Isn’t Just Yes or No, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 7, 1992, at C1 (reporting Gallup poll data). 
 209. See Mathis, supra note 148, at 1. 
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because “[a] bill that codifies Roe [and] parental involvement 
[could] pass.”210 
However, other pragmatists suggested that FOCA could serve an 
important purpose simply by endorsing abortion rights and 
explaining their significance.211 In July 1993, Kate Michelman 
argued that passing FOCA would show that pro-choice legislators 
had fulfilled their “promise [to] support a woman’s freedom to 
choose.”212 Mitchell also claimed that FOCA sent a message that 
women’s abortion rights were as valuable as other constitutional 
rights.213 Although far from fully elaborated, the pragmatists’ idea 
seemed to be that it was important to explain and support the 
rationale for Roe.214 
The Casey Court adopted and expanded on the pragmatists’ idea 
that Roe’s core holding could be preserved at the same time that a 
variety of serious restrictions on abortion rights were permitted.215 
Casey explained that the core holding of Roe was still viable in part 
because the concept of liberty endorsed in it outweighed remaining 
reservations about Roe’s validity.216 A significant part of Roe, the 
Casey Court suggested, was not the actual protections for abortion 
rights set out in the decision but a recognition that “[t]he destiny of 
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception 
of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”217 
In the FOCA debates, some pro-choice activists had contended 
that it was possible to preserve Roe even while discarding its trimester 
framework and permitting restrictions that the Roe Court might not 
have allowed.218 Casey took this argument one step further: even as 
the legal framework of Roe was changed substantially, the central 
holding of the decision could be retained so long as the Court still 
recognized that a woman’s “suffering [was] too intimate and 
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of 
the woman’s role.”219 
 
 210. Edwards, supra note 143, at A20. 
 211. See, e.g., Biskupic, supra note 207, at A1. 
 212. Michelman, supra note 160, at A15. 
 213. See Mathis, supra note 148, at 1. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992). 
 216. See id. at 853. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See, e.g., Biskupic, supra note 207, at A1. 
 219. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
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Like other key aspects of the Casey decision, the Court’s 
understanding of Roe reflected arguments made and tested in the 
FOCA debates. What does Casey’s story reveal about the benefits of 
legislative change campaigns like FOCA? As was the case in Casey, 
using legislation to change the meaning of a judicial decision can be 
conducive to relatively quick constitutional changes. In working to 
achieve timely political success, social movements and 
countermovements engage in intense conflicts, and both sides are 
forced to adopt politically attractive and relatively moderate claims 
that are likely to win over supporters. These are the kinds of conflict-
tested claims that the Court is likely to recognize.220 
Claims emerging from similar legislative struggles may be more 
appealing to the Court, because such claims factor in concerns about 
congressional authority, the reach of past constitutional decisions, 
and the need for political moderation. As countermovements raise 
questions about whether legislation is within the scope of Congress’s 
authority, a movement uses past Supreme Court precedent to 
structure their constitutional interpretations. And as pragmatists 
within movements pressure dissenters to modify their claims, these 
dialogic conflicts produce new but politically moderate constitutional 
claims. 
Although it may have less freedom to explore new constitutional 
claims in a campaign like FOCA, a movement can benefit from the 
constraints it faces. In facing similar limitations, a movement may 
stand a better chance of testing its claims and may make them 
appealing to the Court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Recent scholarship has offered important insight into the 
alternatives to formal constitutional amendments. While explaining 
how these alternatives work and why they may be attractive, theory 
to date has not paid adequate attention to the ways in which social 
movements can and should combine different strategies for 
constitutional change. 
 
 220. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 1327 (analyzing how movement “conflict that can 
discipline constitutional advocacy into understandings that officials can enforce . . . as the 
Constitution”). 
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In the case studies considered here, I offer an account of the 
advantages and drawbacks of making Article V amendment proposals 
and initiating legislative campaigns. In analyzing the history of the 
Human Life Amendment, I suggest that Article V campaigns are 
unique in offering movements time and freedom to unite their forces 
and refine new constitutional ideas. 
By contrast, in legislative campaigns like the one for FOCA, 
movement members must restructure their claims to account for 
limits on congressional authority. Political pressures create similar 
limits on a movement’s ability to explore new constitutional 
positions. In the battle to win votes and forge a bill likely to succeed, 
pragmatists within a movement may encourage their allies to voice 
only mainstream or politically attractive positions. Even when 
dissenting members continue to make claims, those contentions have 
often been altered in response to the concerns expressed by 
pragmatists. When movements rework their arguments in response 
to varying pressures, however, their new claims are both moderate 
and conflict-tested. The pressures that limit a movement’s freedom 
to explore new constitutional arguments may also make these 
arguments more persuasive in court. 
My project in studying change campaigns like FOCA and the 
Human Life Amendment has been to begin a conversation about 
when and how various strategies, even underemphasized ones, result 
in constitutional change. If we are more attentive to the way that 
movements pass between social arenas and profit from different 
methods of change, we will have a better sense of the rich and 
complex ways that movements pursue their goals. Additionally, if 
current scholarship proceeds from the point of view of a social 
movement member or attorney, we will better understand ways to 
change. 
